The formation and internal logic of farmers’ paranoid petition:Based on the fieldwork of G village in Hunan province
【Abstract】 Based on the diachronic investigation of a farmer paranoid petition event in G village, Hunan Province, through a comparative analysis of the behavioral interaction between the government and the petitioners at each stage of the petition,the paper finds that a ’reverse incentive’ effect in which the effectiveness of governance deviates from the policy expectation exists in the petition governance chain composed of the three main actors: higher-level government, primary-level government and petitioners. In petition governance, the order pursuit of ’publicity’ of the higher-level government somewhat acts as a ’reverse incentive’ to the primary-level government’s thinking of ’responsibility avoiding’ and self-interest, thereby providing the petitioners space for profit, and the primary-level government’s weakness becoming ’profitable opportunity’for petitioners. The demonstrative effect of successful petitioning for profit, combined with the space for profit, contributes to the continuation and expansion of petitioning, and finally led to the generation of paranoid petition, which deviated from the original intention of petitioning system. It is suggested that the reverse space of petition incentive can be regulated effectively through the gradual separating petition governance from primary-level stability control, establishing classified petition evaluation system and fully mobilizing and giving full play to rural autonomous forces.
【Key words】 farmers’ paranoid petition； internal logic； reverse incentive effect； petition governance；
- 【文献出处】 湖南农业大学学报(社会科学版) ,Journal of Hunan Agricultural University(Social Sciences) , 编辑部邮箱 ,2021年05期